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Practical Implications of Miller v.
Jackson: Obtaining Relief in Court and
Before the Parole Boardt
Marsha L. Levicktt and Robert G. Schwartzttt
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v.
Alabama,' ending mandatory life sentences for juveniles,
established that developmental and neurological differences
matter when meting out long sentences to juveniles. However,
Miller did not provide nuanced answers to how they matter. The
issues that Miller did not reach have left an assortment of
practical problems to be resolved by legislatures, courts,
practitioners, and correctional administrators.
Some of these issues are being addressed as we write. It is
doubtful, however, that today's reactions will be the last word.
Various judicial and legislative responses to Miller will likely find
their way to higher courts.
They will be measured by a
jurisprudence that began with the United States Supreme Court's
abolition of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons. 2
Roper was reinforced by Graham v. Florida,3 which eliminated life
without parole sentences for juveniles in non-homicide cases, and
was most recently expanded by Miller.
This Article will examine some of the practical challenges
that have emerged since Miller was decided.
Twenty-nine
jurisdictions have mandatory life sentences that have been
vacated by Miller. These jurisdictions must address the sentences
t. We thank law students Alex Dutton, Molly Kenney, Rachel Freedman and
Adam Wallwork, and Juvenile Law Center Zubrow Fellow, Lauren Fine, for their
invaluable assistance. Additionally, some portions of this article previously
appeared in the Criminal Law Reporter. See Marsha Levick, From a Trilogy to a
Quadrilogy:Miller v. Alabama Makes It Four in a Row for U.S. Supreme Court
Cases That Support Differential Treatment of Youth Juveniles, 91 BNA CRIM. L.
REP. 749 (2012), availableat 2012 WL 3943991.
ft. Deputy Director and Chief Counsel, Juvenile Law Center.
ttt. Executive Director, Juvenile Law Center.
1. 132. S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
2. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
3. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
4. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 ("By our count, 29 jurisdictions (28 States and
the Federal Government) make a life-without-parole term mandatory for some
juveniles convicted of murder in adult court.").
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of current and future lifers by answering the following:
1. Is Miller retroactive?
2. What principles should guide courts in re-sentencing
juveniles after their mandatory life sentences are
vacated?
3. What is Miller's impact on state parole schemes?
4. How do juveniles demonstrate rehabilitation to resentencing courts or parole boards when they have
been denied access to prison programs?
In this Article, we answer these questions by looking at
precedent and a Supreme Court jurisprudence that has, in the
case of juveniles, been increasingly informed by the characteristics
of the offender, rather than the nature of the offense.
I.

Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs
Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson were both convicted of
murder for crimes they committed when they were fourteen years
old.' Miller was convicted of murder in the course of arson;
Jackson was convicted of felony murder.6 Under prevailing
Alabama and Arkansas law, both Miller and Jackson were
sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without parole.' Both
sentences were affirmed on appeal and, in the case of Jackson,
affirmed as well in post-conviction proceedings.! The Supreme
Court issued its opinion on June 25, 2012.9
Justice Elena Kagan wrote the majority opinion; she was
joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.o
Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices
Sotomayor joined."
Thomas and Alito, filed dissenting opinions that Justice Scalia
5. Id. at 2460.
6. Id. at 2461-63.
7. See id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b) (West 1997); ALA. CODE §§ 13A5-40(9), 13A-6-2(c) (1982)).
8. See Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010); Jackson v. State,
194 S.W.3d 757 (Ark. 2004).
9. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455.
10. Id. at 2460.
11. Id.
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joined."
Justice Kagan wasted no time in setting forth the rationale
for striking mandatory life without parole sentences for all
juveniles, observing in the opening paragraph of her opinion that
"[s]uch a scheme prevents those meting out punishment from
considering a juvenile's 'lessened culpability' and greater 'capacity
for change,' and runs afoul of our cases' requirement of
individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious
penalties.""
Significantly, the language quoted above links the Court's
death penalty jurisprudence with its cases reviewing juvenile
sentences under the Eighth Amendment.
Justice Kagan
specifically noted that Miller implicates "[t]wo strands of
precedent reflecting the concern with proportionate punishment.""
In the first "strand," the Court adopted categorical bans on
sentences reflecting a mismatch between the culpability of the
offender and the severity of the punishment." This proportionality
analysis drove the Court to strike the death penalty for nonhomicide crimes in Kennedy v. Louisiana, and to similarly
prohibit its imposition on mentally retarded defendants in Atkins
v. Virginia." Of course, this express concern with proportionality
also led to the Court's holdings in Roper and Graham."
The second "strand" of the Court's precedent involves cases
prohibiting the mandatory imposition of the death penalty,
requiring instead individualized sentencing hearings in which the
sentencer considers the offender's individual characteristics as
well as the specific circumstances of the offense before sentencing
the individual to death."
Here, Justice Kagan specifically
acknowledged the Court's recent analogy of juvenile life without
parole to the death penalty itself in Graham," providing the
12. Id.
13. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026-27,
2029-30 (2010)).
14. Id. at 2458.
15. Id.
16. 554 U.S. 407 (2008), modified, reh'g denied, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008).

17. 536 U.S. 304 (2003).
18. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463-67.
19. See id. at 2463-64 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 289 (1976)
(plurality opinion); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1976)).
20. In Graham, Justice Kennedy wrote that "life without parole sentences
share some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other
sentences." Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010). Justice Kennedy
further observed that sentencing a juvenile to die in prison alters the remainder of
his life "by a forfeiture of his life that is irrevocable." Id.
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foundation for the Court's requirement of individualized, nonmandatory sentencing hearings in the juvenile life without parole
cases as well.
Looking to the first strand-proportionality of the challenged
punishment to the blameworthiness of the offender-Justice
Kagan set forth a principle that has implications for juvenile
offenders beyond the specific facts of Miller itself: "Roper and
Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have
diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform . . . 'they

are less deserving of the most severe punishments.""' The Court
reiterated once again its core findings about adolescents: they are
less mature and more prone to reckless, impulsive, and heedless
risk-taking; they are particularly vulnerable to negative peer
pressure; and, as adolescence is inherently a period of transition,
they are less likely to be found "irretrievably depraved."" The
Court acknowledged the uncontroverted body of research and
social science confirming these findings, and noted that the
evidence of these unique attributes of youth had become even
stronger since Roper and Graham were decided."
Importantly, in extending the rationale of Graham from nonhomicide cases to the homicide cases before it in Miller, the Court
held that "none of what is said about children-about their
distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental
vulnerabilities-is crime-specific."" In other words, the unique
characteristics of youth are present and relevant whether the
youth commits a robbery or a murder. Those characteristics
matter in determining the constitutionality of a lifetime of
incarceration, which will end only with the death of the juvenile in
prison. Moreover, Justice Kagan repeated a key corollary to the
Court's holding in Graham: "An offender's age .

.

. is relevant to

the Eighth Amendment, and so criminal procedure laws that fail
to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be
flawed.""

21. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026).
22. Id. at 2475 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026).
23. Id. at 2464 n.5.
24. Id. at 2465.
25. Id. at 2466 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031) (internal quotation marks
omitted). While Chief Justice Roberts appears to have disavowed this core aspect
of the Graham holding in his dissent in Miller, he specifically concurred with it in
Graham itself, acknowledging that an "offender's juvenile status can play a central
role" in considering the proportionality of a particular sentence. Graham, 130 S.
Ct. at 2039 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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The Court invoked the second strand of its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence-the requirement of individualized
sentencing in capital cases-because of Graham's likening of life
without parole to the death penalty.2 6 The Court specifically relied
upon its reasoning in cases striking mandatory death penalty
statutes to undergird its holding in Miller.2 7 As the Court held in
Woodson v. North Carolina," mandatory death sentences violate
the Eighth Amendment because they allow for no consideration of
"the character and record of the individual offender or the
circumstances
of the particular offense excludes from
consideration . . . the possibility of compassionate or mitigating

factors."29
Miller also highlights the Court's insistence in capital cases
that the "mitigating qualities of youth" must be considered before
a sentence of death may be imposed.o Reviewing the prior
holdings of Johnson v. Texas" and Eddings v. Oklahoma,2 Justice
Kagan stressed the striking similarity between the Court's
observations in those cases-e.g., "youth is more than a
chronological fact""-and the question posed by the imposition of
mandatory life without parole sentences on juvenile homicide
offenders." Justice Kagan wrote:
Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a
sentencer from taking account of an offender's age and the
wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.
Under these schemes, every juvenile will receive the same
sentence as every other-the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old,
the shooter and the accomplice, the child from a stable
household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one. And
still worse, each juvenile . . . will receive the same sentence as
the vast majority of adults committing similar homicide
offenses-but really, as Graham noted, a greatersentence than
those adults will serve. In meting out the death penalty, the
elision of all these differences would be strictly forbidden. And
once again, Graham indicates that a similar rule should apply
when a juvenile confronts a sentence of life (and death) in

26. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2459 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027).
27. Id.

28. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
29. Id. at 304. See also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 74-76 (1987); Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982).
30. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458-69.

31. 509 U.S. 350 (1993).
32. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
33. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115).
34. Id. at 2467-68.
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In bringing the two strands of the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence together, Justice Kagan concluded: "So
Graham and Roper and our individualized sentencing cases alike
teach that in imposing a State's harshest penalties, a sentencer
36
misses too much if he treats every child as an adult."
The Court
spelled out what it meant by treating children like children:
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark
features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure
to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into

account the family and home environment that surrounds
him-and from which he cannot usually extricate himself-no

matter how brutal

or dysfunctional.

It neglects the

circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of
his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer
pressures may have affected him.... [Tihis mandatory
punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even
when the circumstances most suggest it.37

Finally, Justice Kagan addressed the Court's decision to
forego a categorical ban on life without parole sentences for
juveniles convicted of homicide.

While the Court viewed its

requirement for individualized sentencing determinations that
would take account of "youth (and all that accompanies it)"
sufficient to address the challenges by Miller and Jackson, the
Court was also clear that Miller must be read in the context of

Roper and Graham.3 ' Thus, though "'[a] State is not required to
guarantee eventual freedom," it "must provide 'some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.""' Justice Kagan further observed that, "given all
we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children's
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we
think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this
harshest possible penalty will be uncommon."40

II. Retroactivity of Miller
The Miller Court identified twenty-nine jurisdictions in
which juveniles have been subject to mandatory life without parole

35. Id.

36. Id. at 2468 (emphasis added).
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id. at 2469.
Id. (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030).
Id.
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sentences." As of January 2008, it was estimated that 2,570
individuals nationwide were serving life without parole sentences
for crimes they committed as juveniles.42 Given the substantial
number of individuals potentially affected by the Miller holding,
lawyers began speculating as to its retroactivity even before the
"ink was dry" on the decision.
A.

Decisions to Date
The record to date is mixed, offering no clear blueprint for
resolution of the retroactivity question. No state supreme court
has yet decided retroactivity, although the issue is currently
pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,' and the
Minnesota Supreme Court," and will likely be considered by the
Missouri Supreme Court in the spring/summer of 2013." Roughly
a handful of intermediate appellate courts issued decisions on
retroactivity since Miller; these decisions must still be tested by
higher courts. This Article will now discuss a brief, chronological
summary of court decisions on retroactivity jurisdictional category.
In one of the earliest cases to address Miller's potential
retroactivity (albeit indirectly), an appellate court in Iowa
remanded the case of a defendant serving life without parole for a
crime she committed at seventeen.4 ' The defendant challenged her
sentence as violative of the Eighth Amendment, and the court
vacated it "[u]nder the principles articulated in Miller."" Although
the court did not discuss retroactivity, by implication Miller
operated retroactively.
Florida, too, addressed whether Miller is retroactive. In
Geter v. Florida,"the intermediate appellate court held that Miller
cannot be applied retroactively to Florida post-conviction
proceedings. Characterizing Miller's ruling as being more about
41. Id. at 2471.
42. See ELIZABETH CALVIN, HUM. RTS. WATCH, WHEN IDIE ... THEY'LL SEND
ME HoME (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/105473/section/2.
43. See Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 51 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2012). Cunningham
was argued before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in September 2012.
44. Timothy Patrick Chambers v. State of Minnesota, Case #A11-1954.
Chambers was argued before the Minnesota Supreme Court in March 2013.
45. See State v. Nathan, Nos. ED 96851, ED 96832, 2012 WL 5860933 (Mo. Ct.
App. Nov. 20, 2012) (transferring the defendant's appeal to the Missouri Supreme
Court).
46. Iowa v. Lockheart, 820 N.W.2d 769 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (unpublished table
decision).
47. Id. at *3.
48. No. 3D12-1736, 2012 WL 4448860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2012).
49. Id.
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process than substance, and applying Florida precedent, the court
concluded that Miller was not "a development of fundamental
significance."' 0 The court compared Miller and the United States
Supreme Court case of Apprendi v. New Jersey," which the Florida
Supreme Court had previously found not to be retroactive.5 2 Both
Apprendi and Miller, according to Geter, "implicat[e] procedural
changes with unique and narrow applications," constitute "new
procedural rules in criminal law that do not affect the finality of
the criminal conviction," and "do not preclude the sentencer from
imposing the statutory maximum, but rather require the
sentencer to follow certain procedures before doing so.""
Taking a different approach, the Louisiana Supreme Court
remanded a juvenile lifer's case "for reconsideration after
conducting a sentencing hearing in accord with the principles
enunciated in Miller and stating the reasons for reconsideration
and sentencing on the record."'
In Michigan, an appellate court held that Miller is not
retroactive, focusing on the fact that it did not perceive the ban on
juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) to be categorical, nor the rule
announced to be "watershed."" After reviewing previous Eighth
Amendment case law, the court analyzed Miller as well as cases
governing retroactivity, and ultimately deemed Miller to be
"procedural in nature."5 Focusing on the fact that Miller did not
categorically ban life without parole for juveniles, the court
deemed Miller distinguishable from Graham." It also determined
that Miller was not a watershed rule because it "focused solely on
accuracy in sentencing and does not address or impinge on the
accuracy of a juvenile defendant's conviction for a homicide
offense."" Despite this ruling, however, many lower courts in
Michigan have subsequently granted petitions for resentencing,
either by distinguishing or by simply stating that the decision was
50. Id. at *3-8.

51. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi v. New Jersey invalidated a state hate crime
sentence enhancement statute as violative of due process. Id. at 491-97.
52. See Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 839-43 (Fla. 2005).
53. Geter, 2012 WL 4448860, at *6.
54. State v. Simmons, 99 So. 3d 28 (La. 2012) (per curiam) (stating that Miller
"required that a sentencing court consider an offender's youth and attendant
characteristics as mitigating circumstances before deciding whether to impose the
harshest possible penalty for juveniles who have committed a homicide offense").
55. People v. Carp, No. 307758, 2012 WL 5846553, at *15-*17 (Mich. Ct. App.
Nov. 15, 2012).
56. Id. at *14.
57. Id. at *20.
58. Id. at *16.
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wrong and that it would be an injustice to follow the appellate
court.
Additionally, the Michigan Supreme Court has been
denying motions for resentencing "without prejudice to any relief
that the defendant may seek under Miller v. Alabama.""
More recently, appellate courts in Illinois have held that
Miller is retroactive. In People v. Morfin," the First Appellate
District of Illinois found that "Millerconstitutes a new substantive
rule" and thus, "pursuant to Teague, [it] is applicable retroactively
on collateral review."6 1 The court explained that "Miller creates a
new rule of law that was not required by either the precedents on
what penalties a minor constitutionally cannot receive (Roper and
Graham) or by the cases cited in Miller requiring sentencing
discretion for the death penalty."
Specifically, the court observed
that while Miller
[D]oes not forbid a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole for a minor, it does require Illinois courts to hold a
sentencing hearing for every minor convicted of first-degree
murder at which a sentence other than natural life
imprisonment must be available for consideration. Miller
mandates a sentencing range broader than that provided by
statute for minors convicted of first-degree murder who could
otherwise receive only natural life imprisonment.
In reaching this determination, the court specifically noted
its disagreement "with the Florida courts in Geter and Gonzalez
and the Michigan court in Carp."
In People v. Williams,6 5 another Illinois appellate court held
that Miller is fully retroactive, remanding for an evidentiary
hearing on an unrelated innocence claim and, in the alternative,
for a resentencing hearing in accordance with Miller.66
The
petitioner had submitted three prior post-conviction petitions and
the court engaged in a full Teague analysis. In its reasoning, the
court stated that Miller announced a new "watershed rule[ I of
criminal procedure."'
The court found that "Miller not only
changed procedures, but also made a substantial change in the law
in holding under the Eighth Amendment that the government
59. See, e.g., People v. Reed, 821 N.W.2d 886 (Mich. 2012); People v. BurnsPerry, 823 N.W.2d 601 (Mich. 2012).
60. 367 Ill. Dec. 282 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
61. Id. at 294.
62. Id.
63. Id..
64. Id.
65. 367 Ill. Dec. 503 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
66. Id. at 520.
67. Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)).
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cannot constitutionally apply a mandatory sentence of life without
parole for homicides committed by juveniles."' The court also
gave weight to the fact that the Supreme Court vacated Kuntrell
Jackson's sentence and remanded for resentencing, and cautioned
that, like imposing life without parole on a child, it would similarly
"be cruel and unusual to apply [Miller's holding] only to new
cases."' The Supreme Court of Illinois recently agreed to address
the issue of retroactivity in People v. Davis."
In federal district court, the retroactivity argument has found
more success. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a judge
granted a prisoner's third amended petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, "to the extent that it challenges the petitioner's mandatory
sentence of life without parole in light of Miller v. Alabama" and
vacated the petitioner's sentence with an order that he "may be
resentenced within 120 days." In the context of a challenge to the
constitutionality of Michigan's parole statute under Section 1983
because it denied parole eligibility to juveniles serving mandatory
life without parole sentences, the Eastern District of Michigan
observed that "if ever there was a legal rule that should-as a
matter of law and morality-be given retroactive effect, it is the
rule announced in Miller. To hold otherwise would allow the state
to impose unconstitutional punishment on some persons but not
others, an intolerable miscarriage of justice."72 The court in Hill
further described that it
[Wiould find Miller retroactive on collateral review, because it
is

a

new

substantive

rule,

which

"generally

apply

retroactively." "Arule is substantive rather than procedural if
it alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the
law punishes." "Such rules apply retroactively because they
'necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant ... faces
punishment that the law cannot impose upon him."' Miller
alters the class of persons (juveniles) who can receive a
category of punishment (mandatory life without parole).
Further, the Supreme Court applied Miller to the companion
case before it-on collateral review-and vacated the sentence of
Kuntrell Jackson. "[O]nce a new rule is applied to the
defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice
requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are

68. Id. at 519.

69. Id.
70. No. 1-11-2577, 2012 WL 6863262 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 28, 2012).
71. Order of Judge Timothy J. Savage, Songster v. Beard, No. 04-5916 (Sept. 6,
2012).
72. Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30,
2013).
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similarly situated."7
The federal appeals courts are more split on the issue of
Miller's retroactivity: the Fifth Circuit concluded that the case did
not merit retroactive application, while the Fourth Circuit, in a
case in a different procedural posture, granted a petitioner's right
to file a successive habeas petition." In an extremely short
decision in Craig v. Cain, the Fifth Circuit held that Miller is not
retroactive as it fails to satisfy either exception under Teague."
Specifically, the court found that it fails the first Teague test in
that it "does not categorically bar all sentences of life
imprisonment for juveniles" and instead "bars only those
sentences made mandatory by a sentencing scheme."" In finding
that Miller did not meet the second Teague exception either, the
court highlighted the fact that only Gideon v. Wainwright" has
been characterized as a "watershed rule."" Importantly, however,
the Fifth Circuit's January 4, 2013 order in Craig recently has
been challenged on the grounds that the court examined the
retroactivity of Miller without either party having raised the issue,
and without it being germane to the resolution of the habeas
claims before it, which did not seek sentencing relief." In fact, not
only did the petitioner not present any claim or argument that
raises or even implicates the retroactivity of Miller, but the
petitioner also had not exhausted those claims in the state courts
and thus they were not properly before the Fifth Circuit for
review."o The Eleventh Circuit agreed that Miller was not
retroactive in In re Morgan,"' finding the rule procedural rather
than substantive. However, the Morgan court failed to even
consider or discuss Jackson, who himself received relief despite the
post-conviction posture of his appeal. Taking a different approach
from Craig and Morgan, in an unpublished per curium opinion,
the Fourth Circuit granted a prisoner's motion for "authorization
73. Id. at 2 n.2.
74. See Craig v. Cain, No. 12-30035, at *1-2, 2013 WL 69128 (5th Cir. 2013); In
re Evans, 449 F. App'x 284 (4th Cir. 2011).
75. Craig, 2013 WL 69128, at *1-2.
76. Id. at *2.
77. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

78. Craig, 2013 WL 69128, at *2 (quoting Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 413
(2004)).
79. See Appellant's Opposition to the State's Motion to Publish and Motion to
Withdraw January 4, 2013 Order at *1, Craig v. Cain, No. 12-30035, 2013 WL
69128 (5th Cir. Jan. 14, 2013) (describing that the petitioner raised only claims
regarding the guilt phase of his trial).
80. See id. at *1-2.
81. No. 13-11175-D, 2013 VL 1499498 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 2013).
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to file a successive habeas application" because he had "made a
'prima facie showing' that his 'claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable."' 8 2
B. Retroactivity Analysis
Generally, many scholars and practitioners believe that the
starting place for any discussion of retroactivity is the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Teague v. Lane.' There, the
Court laid out the framework for determining whether a rule
announced in one of its opinions should be applied retroactively to
judgments in criminal cases that are already final on direct
review.
Even before addressing the question of retroactivity under
Teague, however, it is not unreasonable to argue-like some of the
cases referenced above-that the Supreme Court has already
answered the question by applying Miller to cases on collateral
review. As noted above in Miller, the Court vacated the sentences
of both Miller and Jackson.' While Miller was before the Supreme
Court on direct review, Jackson's conviction became final long
before the Court announced its new rule in Miller." The Court's
application of its holding in Miller to Jackson's case necessarily
dictates retroactivity of the new rule." There is no other logical
interpretation of the Court's decision except that it applied the
same reasoning and holding to Jackson's case, which was before
the Court on collateral review.
Had Miller not applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review, Jackson would have been precluded from the relief he was
82. In re Evans, 449 F. App'x 284 (4th Cir. 2011).
83. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality).
84. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (announcing that the Court
"accordingly reverseld] the judgments of the Arkansas Supreme Court and
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and remand[ed Jackson's case] for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion").
85. Id. at 2461.
86. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 666 (2001). Justice Thomas explains that
under § 2244(b), "[m]ultiple cases can render a new rule retroactive only if the
holdings in those cases necessarily dictate retroactivity of the new rule." Id.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Tyler is likewise instructive. O'Connor explained
that the Court "may 'malkle' a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that
logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule." Id. at 668. She clarified that
"the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from
which one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively" and that the Court "can
be said to have 'made' a rule retroactive within the meaning of § 2244(b)(2)(A) only
where the Court's holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is
retroactive." Id. at 669. Miller represents such a clear dictation.
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granted." Indeed, Justice O'Connor -noted this precise point in
Teague: "[Ounce a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case
announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be
applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated."" Justice
O'Connor explained further:
Were we to recognize the new rule urged by petitioner in this
[collateral review] case, we would have to give petitioner the
benefit of that new rule even though it would not be applied
retroactively to others

similarly situated.

. .

. [T]he

harm

caused by the failure to treat similarly situated defendants
alike cannot be exaggerated: such inequitable treatment
"hardly comports with the ideal of 'administration of justice
with an even hand."' (if a rule is applied to the defendant in
the case announcing the rule, it should be applied to all others
similarly situated). Our refusal to allow such disparate
treatment in the direct review context led us to adopt the first
part of Justice Harlan's retroactivity approach in Griffith.
"The fact that the new rule may constitute a clear break with
the past has no bearing on the 'actual inequity that results'
when only one of many similarly situated defendants receives
the benefit of the new rule."
If there were no other way to avoid rendering advisory
opinions, we might well agree that the inequitable treatment
described above is "an insignificant cost for adherence to sound
principles of decision-making." But there is a more principled
way of dealing with the problem. We can simply refuse to
announce a new rule in a given case unless the rule would be
applied retroactively to the defendant in the case and to all
others similarly situated. .

.

. We think this approach is a

sound one. Not only does it eliminate any problems of
rendering advisory opinions, it also avoids the inequity
resulting from the uneven application of new rules to similarly
situated defendants. We therefore hold that, implicit in the
retroactivity approach we adopt today, is the principle that
habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules
would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral
89
review through one of the two exceptions we have articulated.

87. Notably, Jackson and Miller were joined-the Court did not simply apply
Miller to Jackson, or remand Jackson for reconsideration in light of Miller.
Instead, the two received the same relief, in the same manner. This is clear from
the Court's language, which announced that both cases were remanded "for further

proceedings not inconsistent with" its opinion. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455, at 2475.
Moreover, on remand, the state of Arkansas has not contested that Jackson is
entitled to a resentencing. See Brief of Appellee on Remand from the United States
Supreme Court at 10, Jackson v. Hobbs, No. 09-145 (Ark. Jan. 7, 2013) (citing
Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 218 (1988)).
88. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300.
89. Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) ("[S]elective application of new rules violates
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As acknowledged in Teague, unless the Court's granting of
relief to Jackson extends to both him and other similarly situated
defendants, the Court is doing nothing more than rendering an
advisory opinion-something the Court may not do.90 Therefore, if
a new rule is announced and applied to a defendant on collateral
review, as in Miller, that rule is necessarily retroactive.9 '
Significantly, the retroactive effect of Miller was apparent even to
the dissenting Justices in the case. Chief Justice Roberts, joined
by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, lamented that the decision
would likely invalidate more than 2,000 sentences.92
Additionally, the fact that Miller struck the mandatory
sentence of life without parole as violative of the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment further
strengthens the argument that Miller must be applied retroactively.
First, the Court relied upon two strands of precedent regarding
proportionate punishment that have themselves been applied
retroactively. As discussed above, the first strand includes cases
adopting "categorical bans on sentencing practices based on
mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the
severity of a penalty."" These cases include the Court's decisions
banning the execution of mentally retarded individuals in Atkins
v. Virginia," banning the death penalty for juvenile offenders in
Roper v. Simmons,96 and banning life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders in Graham
97
v. Florida.
Roper was retroactive when it was announced, as it
was decided on collateral review." Although Atkins was decided
on direct appeal, because of the categorical nature of the rule
the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same.").
90. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 205 (1962). See also U.S. CONsT. art.
III, § 2.
91. See also Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663 ("The new rule becomes retroactive, not by
the decisions of the lower court or by the combined action of the Supreme Court and
the lower courts, but simply by the actions of the Supreme Court.").
92. Miller, 132 S. Ct., at 2481 ("[Ilndeed, the Court's gratuitous prediction [that
life without parole sentences will be 'uncommon'] appears to be nothing other than
an invitation to overturn life without parole sentences imposed by juries and trial
judges.") (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 2463.
94. Id.

95. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
96. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
97. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 584 (1982)
(finding the death penalty grossly disproportionate and excessive for a crime of
rape of an adult woman); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008)
(finding the death penalty unconstitutional for child rapists).
98. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.
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announced, and the Supreme Court's prior jurisprudence
regarding such categorical rules," courts have uniformly applied
Atkins retroactively to cases on collateral review."'o Likewise,
courts generally have applied Graham'scategorical bar against life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders retroactively; 01 cases declining to apply
Graham retroactively involved petitioners outside the scope of

Graham'sholding. 102
The second line of cases includes those "requiring that
sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant
and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death." 3
This line of cases includes Woodson v. North Carolina,'' Lockett v.
Ohio,"' Sumner v. Shuman,"0 and Eddings v. Oklahoma.' 7 These
cases have likewise received retroactive application. Sumner
struck down a statute mandating the death penalty for an inmate
99. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
100. See In re Ochoa v. Simmons, 485 F.3d 538, 540 (10th Cir. 2007); In re
Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740
(5th Cir. 2003).
101. See, e.g., In re Moss, 703 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2013) (allowing petitioner to
file a second or successive habeas motion pursuant to Graham); In re Evans, 449 F.
App'x 284 (4th Cir. 2011); In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011) ("By the
combined effect of the holding of Graham itself and the first Teague exception,
Graham was therefore made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court
as a matter of logical necessity under Tyler."); Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204,
1221 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding Graham applies retroactively because it fit under
the Teague exception for "new rules 'prohibiting a certain category of punishment
for a class of defendants because of their status or offense') (quoting Penry, 492
U.S. at 330).
102. See, e.g., Craig v. Cain, No. 12-30035, 2013 WL 69128 (5th Cir. 2013),
People v. Carp, No. 307758, 2012 WL 5846553 (Mich. App. Nov. 15, 2012); Geter v.
State, No. 3D121736, 2012 WL 4448860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2012); Silas v.
Pennsylvania, No. 08-0659, 2011 WL 4359973, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2011)
("First, there is no indication that Graham was 'made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review.' Second, the rule in Graham does not apply to
Petitioner.") (internal citations omitted); Lawson v. Pennsylvania, No. Civ. A. 092120, 2010 WL 5300531, at *3 n.8. (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2010) ("[T]here is no
indication that the Supreme Court has held Graham retroactively applicable on
collateral review; furthermore, Graham does not extend relief to someone convicted
of a homicide offense."). It should be noted that the Court's language in Lawson
and Silas was dicta, and Graham applied to neither petitioner.
Moreover,
Petitioner in Silas had not raised or briefed the Court regarding the retroactivity of
Graham; the Court raised the issue sua sponte. In Michigan, a number of lower
courts have granted petitions for resentencings despite the Carp ruling, either by
distinguishing or by simply stating that the decision was wrong and that it would
be an injustice to follow the appellate court.
103. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463-64 (2012).
104. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
105. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
106. 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
107. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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convicted of murder while serving a life sentence without the
possibility of parole; it was retroactive to cases on collateral review
because it was decided on collateral review.0 8
Although Lockett and Eddings were decided on direct appeal,
both cases have been applied retroactively to other inmates long
after their cases became final." "[Tihe confluence of these two
lines of precedent leads to the conclusion that mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth
Amendment.""o Miller articulates a new rule typical of the two
lines of precedent it relies on and should receive the same
retroactive application.
Second, it can be argued that any Supreme Court ruling
striking a sentence as cruel and unusual punishment should be
deemed retroactive on that basis alone. The Court repeatedly has
recognized that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment "flows from the basic 'precept of justice that
punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to
[the] offense."' 1 In determining what constitutes a cruel and
unusual punishment, the Court has considered the proportionality
of the sentence imposed to the harm committed."' The Court has
emphasized the need for objective factors to determine the gravity
of the offenses in comparison to the criminal sentences,"' in order
to assess the constitutionality of those sentences based on "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.""4 In Miller, the Court observed that:
[Bly requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive
108. Sumner, 483 U.S. at 68. See also Thigpen v. Thigpen, 541 So.2d 465, 466
(Ala. 1989) (applying Sumner retroactively to case on collateral review).
109. See, e.g., Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 599 n.7 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting
that "retroactive application" of Lockett is "required"); Harvard v. State, 486 So. 2d
537, 539 (Fla. 1986) (applying Lockett retroactively); Songer v. Wainwright, 769
F.2d 1488, 1489 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying Lockett retroactively); Shuman v. Wolff,
571 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D. Nev. 1983) (applying rule from Eddings retroactively).
110. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
111. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (finding the death penalty unconstitutional for
child rapists)).
112 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 277 (1983) (holding life without
parole "significantly disproportionate" punishment for falsifying a check when the
defendant had only relatively minor prior offenses); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1982) (finding the death penalty "grossly disproportionate and excessive for a
crime of rape" of an adult woman); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)
(holding the death penalty disproportionate to the crime of felony murder, when the
defendant "did not kill or intend to kill").
113. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 ("Eighth Amendment judgments . . . should be
informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.").
114. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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lifetime incarceration without the possibility of parole,
regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the
nature of their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes
before us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment."
Unless Miller is applied retroactively, children who
committed their crimes and exhausted their appeals before Miller
was decided will be deemed more blameworthy than children
convicted of homicide during or after the pendency of Miller, and
will remain condemned to "die in prison.""6 Such a conclusion
Eighth
Amendment
and
contravenes
defies
reason
As the Illinois Appellate Court recently
jurisprudence."'
concluded in finding Miller retroactive to cases on collateral
review, if mandatory life without parole sentences are now cruel
and unusual, "[i]t would also be cruel and unusual to apply that
principle only to new cases.""' In Hill v. Snyder, the recent
successful challenge to the constitutionality of Michigan's parole
11
statute under Section 1983, the court echoed this observation.9
In finding Miller retroactive, the court declared that "[tio hold
otherwise would allow the state to impose unconstitutional
punishment on some persons but not others, an intolerable
miscarriage of justice." 2 ' The challenge came in the form of a
motion for summary judgment, and the court deemed Miller a

115. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
116. See id. at 2460 (invalidating the mandatory imposition of sentences of life
without parole because it does not allow those deciding the punishment to
factor in the reduced blameworthiness and greater likelihood for
rehabilitation ofjuveniles).
117. See, e.g., In re Brown, 457 F.3d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that in order
to "file a successive petition based on the new constitutional rule announced in
Atkins," a petitioner must show that his petition is supported by a new, retroactive
constitutional rule that was not available to him earlier); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (banning the death penalty for "mentally retarded offenders"
whom the Court acknowledged were viewed by society as "categorically less
culpable than the average criminal"). Given the Court's language about culpability
in Atkins, it would have been inconceivable for the Court to have sanctioned the
further execution of mentally retarded individuals simply because they had
exhausted their direct appeal rights. The same holds true for the pronouncements
made in Miller. Imagine, for example, that the Supreme Court were to find that it
is cruel and unusual to torture someone today: how could it possibly then sanction
torture tomorrow for those who happened to have received the sentence and
exhausted their direct appeal rights before the decision was handed down?
118. People v. Williams, No. 1-11-1145, slip op. at 28 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 12, 2012),
available at http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2012/lstDistrict/
1111145.pdf.
119. Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, slip op. at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013),
available at http://www.freep.com/assets/freep/pdflC4200020130.PDF.
120. Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30,
2013) (emphasis in original).
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substantive rule because it "alters the class of persons (juveniles)
who can receive a category of punishment (mandatory life without
parole)."12 '
Finally, Miller meets the Court's retroactivity test under
Teague. The Teague Court held that "new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have
become final before the new rules are announced,"'22 except in two
instances. First, a new constitutional rule is retroactive if it
"places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe,"' 23 or addresses a "substantive categorical guarantee[ ]
accorded by the Constitution," such as a rule "prohibiting a certain
category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their
status or offense."'24 Second, Teague held that "a new rule should
be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of 'those
procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered

liberty.""'
The decisions in Atkins v. Virginia, which barred the
execution of mentally retarded individuals, and Roper v. Simmons,
which prohibited the death penalty for juveniles, have been
applied retroactively because they "prohibit[ ] a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or
offense."'2 6 Similarly, Graham v. Florida "bar[red] the imposition
of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole on a juvenile
offender"-i.e., barred a category of punishment for a class of
defendants."7 Like the rules announced in Atkins, Roper, and
Graham, Miller "prohibit[s] a certain category of punishment,"
mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, "for
a class of defendants,"-juvenile homicide offenders- 28 satisfying
the first prong of Teague.
Miller also meets the second Teague exception. The second
exception applies to "watershed rules of criminal procedure" and to
"those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished." 2 ' This occurs when the rule
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
692).
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at *2 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989)).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 677, 692 (1971)).
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329-30 (1989).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (alteration in original) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at
Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2001).
In re Sparks, 657 F.3d at 262.
Horn, 536 U.S. at 272.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
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"requires the observance of 'those procedures that. . . are 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty."'.. To be "watershed" a rule must
first "be necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk" of
inaccuracy in a criminal proceeding, and second, "alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the
fairness of a proceeding."' 3 ' The Supreme Court has recognized
that sentencing is a critical component of the trial process, and
thus directly affects the accuracy of criminal trials. 3 2
First, the
Miller satisfies both of these requirements.
mandatory life without parole sentences cause an "impermissibly
large risk" that the harshest sentence available for juveniles will
be inaccurately imposed.'" Such a mandatory sentence fails to
consider the unique characteristics of youths, which make them
"constitutionally different" from adults. By requiring that specific
factors be considered before a court can impose a life without
parole sentence on a juvenile, Miller also alters our understanding
of what bedrock procedural elements are necessary to the fairness
Indeed, state appellate courts have
of such a proceeding."'
adopted this analysis. In People v. Williams"' for example, the
Illinois appellate court granted the petitioner the right to file a
second or successive habeas petition because Miller is a
"watershed rule," and because, at his pre-Miller trial, petitioner
had been "denied a basic 'precept of justice' by not receiving any
consideration of his age from the circuit court in sentencing."
The court found that "Millernot only changed procedures, but also
made a substantial change in the law.""
More recently, the Supreme Court has focused on whether a
new rule is "substantive" or "procedural" to determine its
130. Id. at 307 (internal citations omitted).
131. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007) (internal citations omitted);
Figuereo-Sanchez v. United States, 678 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 2012).
132. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 n.22 (1968) (applying
retroactively a decision on a jury selection process that related to sentencing
because it "necessarily undermined 'the very integrity of the . . . process' that
decided the [defendant's] fate" (internal citation omitted)).
133. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, 2469 (explaining that imposing mandatory life
without parole sentences "poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment");
Whorton, 549 U.S. at 418.
134. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (requiring sentencing judges "to take into account
how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison").
135. People v. Williams, No. 1-11-1145, slip op. (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 12, 2012),
available at http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2012/
lstDistrict/1111145.pdf.
136. Id. at 16.
137. Id. at 15.
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retroactivity under Teague."' A new rule is "substantive" if it
"alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law
punishes."' Generally, new substantive "rules apply retroactively
because they 'necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant
stands convicted of an act the law does not make criminal' or faces
a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him."'
Using the Court's updated terminology likewise favors
retroactivity. While scholars, lawyers, and judges may debate
whether a ban on mandatory sentences of juvenile life without
parole constitutes a substantive or procedural rule, it can
reasonably be argued that Miller established a substantive rule
because it banned a "category of punishment" (mandatory
sentencing) for a "class of defendants" (juveniles). The new rule
"alters ... the class of persons that the law punishes."' In Miller,
the Court modified the class of persons eligible for mandatory life
without parole sentences by excluding juvenile offenders from the
statutes' reach.14 ' Moreover, characterizing the Miller rule as
substantive is consistent with the retroactive application of
Sumner v. Shuman, where the Supreme Court struck a mandatory
death penalty scheme."' Like Miller, the Sumner Court barred
only the mandatory imposition of the death sentence and
permitted the discretionary imposition of the sentence after
consideration of mitigating factors. Sumner has been applied
retroactively to cases on collateral review."'
If Sumner is
retroactive, Miller must be as well.
138. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).
141. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353.
142. Opponents of retroactivity may argue that the new rule in Miller is
procedural, since Miller bars only the imposition of mandatory life without parole,
and still theoretically allows for the discretionary imposition of such a sentence.
Indeed, Miller recognized, as previously held by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957 (1991), that in the adult context, there is no substantive right against
mandatory sentencing. "A sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual" does
not "becomle] so simply because it is mandatory." Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2470 (2012). However, the Court rejected Harmelin in the juvenile context,
writing that "Harmelin had nothing to do with children and did not purport to
apply its holding to the sentence of juvenile offenders." Id. Instead, the Court
likened its holding to Roper and Graham, decisions holding that "a sentencing rule
permissible for adults may not be so for children." Id. By rejecting Harmelin, the
Court implicitly held that mandatory life without parole is categorically cruel and
unusual for juveniles-and thus "prohibit[ed] a certain category of punishment for
a class of defendants because of their status or offense." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492

U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
143. 483 U.S. 66, 68 (1987).
144. Id. at 68. See also Thigpen v. Thigpen, 541 So. 2d 465, 466 (Ala. 1989).
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III. Now that Miller Has Been Decided, What Can
Sentencing Courts Do?
Courts must now grapple with applying Miller to individuals
seeking resentencing-either on direct appeal, in the absence of
new applicable legislation, or through collateral challengesassuming the decision is deemed retroactive.
The immediate question in all affected jurisdictions is what
sentence may be imposed on juveniles convicted of first- or seconddegree murder in place of mandatory life without parole. If state
law already provides for an alternative term of years or life
sentence with the possibility of parole, the sentencer can likely
impose one of those options (as well as consider a non-mandatory
life without parole sentence if such a discretionary sentence is
already statutorily available).' However, in the absence of new or
currently available alternative sentencing schemes, jurisdictions
that only have the sentencing option of mandatory life without
parole, or jurisdictions with no parole mechanism in place, will
lack an applicable, constitutional sentencing scheme for juveniles
convicted of first- or second-degree murder.'"
Under these
circumstances, there is ample precedent from many state courts
supporting the imposition of the next most severe statutory
sentence available for that offense, or the next most severe
sentence for any lesser-included offense if no other statutory
sentence is available for the initial offense.
In Pennsylvania, for example, in Commonwealth v. Story,14 '
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that once the death
penalty scheme had been declared unconstitutional, the only
sentence that could be imposed was the next most severe sentence
statutorily available, life imprisonment."' The Court held that
because the "death penalty has been unconstitutionally entered,
the sentence of death must be vacated and a sentence of life
imprisonment imposed."'
In Commonwealth v. Bradley,"' the
145. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §973.014 (2013) (establishing life without parole as a
discretionary penalty).
146. Courts are not required to wait for the legislature to act to implement the
discretionary procedures required by Miller/Jackson. In an attempt to comply with
Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court of Louisiana set forth guidelines for how to
construct an evidentiary hearing to determine if an inmate was in fact mentally
retarded (and thus eligible for resentencing). State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835,
858-60 (La. 2002). The court remanded to the trial court to conduct the hearing
based on the guidelines it set forth. Id. at 858.
147. 440 A.2d 488 (Pa. 1981).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 492.
150. 295 A.2d 842 (Pa. 1972).
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court was presented with a similar
sentencing challenge after the state death penalty statute was
declared unconstitutional pursuant to Furman v. Georgia,"'which
invalidated statutes that had "no standards [to] govern the
selection of the penalty [of death or imprisonment]" and left the
decision "to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries.""' In
Bradley as well, the court imposed the next most severe sentence
available: life imprisonment."' In State v. Davis,"' the North
Carolina Supreme Court found that "common sense and
rudimentary justice demand[ed] that the maximum permissible
sentence of life imprisonment . . . be imposed upon person[s]

convicted of first-degree murder or rape committed between" the
case in which the Court first applied Furman and the date of the
enactment of a new statute which rewrote the death sentencing
*
55
provisions.
Additionally, resentencing based on the lesser-included
offense is in line with the Supreme Court decisions in Roper,
Graham, and now Miller that juveniles are categorically less
culpable than adults who commit similar offenses. In other words,
juveniles who commit murder are categorically less culpable than
adults who commit murder. Therefore, it is logical to look to
sentences for lesser-included offenses since the legislature has
consciously adopted sentences other than life without parole for
those adult murderers whom they consider less culpable. This
approach also resolves the Supreme Court's concern in Graham
and Miller that juveniles sentenced to life, because of their young
age, serve longer sentences than adult murderers who receive the
151. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
152. Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
153. Bradley, 295 A.2d at 845. See also Commonwealth v. Edwards, 411 A.2d
493, 494 (Pa. 1979) (vacating the death sentence and imposing life imprisonment

because "the statute authorizing the death sentence was declared unconstitutional
by this Court in Commonwealth v. Moody").
154. 227 S.E.2d 97 (N.C. 1976).

155. Id. at 199. See also Calloway v. Blackburn, 612 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980)
(finding no violation of separation of powers doctrine for Louisiana Supreme Court
to sentence defendant for lesser included offense after death penalty found
unconstitutional); Carey v. Garrison, 452 F. Supp. 485, 488 (W.D.N.C. 1978)
(describing how an unconstitutional sentence was commuted down to the next
harshest constitutional sentence made available by statute); State v. Lindquist, 589
P.2d 101, 106 (Idaho 1979) (directing to resentence for lesser included offense of
second degree murder after death sentence ruled unconstitutional); State v. Craig,
340 So. 2d 191, 194 (La. 1976) (ordering defendant to be sentenced to most serious

penalty for next lesser included offense because mandatory death penalty struck for
aggravated rape); People v. Webb, 542 P.2d 77, 79 (Colo. 1975) (en banc)
(resentencing defendant to lesser-included offense of criminal negligence after
manslaughter statute was struck down).

20131

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

391

same sentence.156
One other point should be noted in considering what
alternative sentences may be imposed on juvenile offenders. The
imposition of any higher sentence other than that available at the
time the underlying felony or homicide was committed may well
violate due process, ex post facto, and equal protection rights. In
many jurisdictions within the purview of Miller, only one possible
sentence for first- or second-degree murder-life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole-may have been statutorily
available. Under Miller, this mandatory sentence has now been
struck down. These state codes therefore lack a constitutional
sentence for first- or second-degree murder committed by a
juvenile. It is well established that a juvenile's ex post facto rights
would be violated, however, if the state were to "inflict
punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any
punishment" or to inflict "greater punishment, than the law
annexed to the offence.""' Thus, any sentence imposed that is
greater than a statutorily established, constitutional sentence
would amount to a judicially created, retroactive punishment that
was not "annexed to the offence" at the time the crimes occurred.
This further supports the argument that juveniles must be
sentenced in accordance with the lesser-included sentence
available.
For similar reasons, imposing a judicially created sentencein the absence of an available, constitutional statutory
alternative-that is greater than any statutorily established
constitutional sentence would also violate juveniles' due process
rights.'"
Likewise, a judicially created sentence, such as a
sentence of life with the possibility of parole, would violate equal
protection by treating the Miller class of juveniles differently than
those who are sentenced according to constitutionally sound
statutes.'" For example, in Story, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court refused to permit the defendant to be subjected to another
156. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) ("Life without
parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile. Under this sentence a
juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his
life in prison than an adult offender.").
157. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 612 (2003) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. 386, 389 (1798)).
158. Cf. Commonwealth v. Story, 440 A.2d 488, 492 (Pa. 1981) (vacating a death
sentence for a defendant who had been retried after a new death penalty statute
was enacted).
159. Id. ("Because appellant was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death under
an unconstitutional statute, he must be treated the same as all those persons
whose death penalties have been set aside.").
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capital sentencing proceeding under the newly enacted sentencing
statute. The Court explained that such an approach would
"violate equal protection and due process.""
Of course, the devil is in the details. The next most severe
sentence available, which may require looking to the statutory
sentence for lesser-included offenses, will vary from state to state.
Again, in Pennsylvania, the next most severe sentence for firstdegree murder is a maximum sentence of forty years for the lesserincluded offense of third-degree homicide.'61 For second-degree
felony murder, the lesser-included offense would be the underlying
felony, i.e., robbery or another first-degree felony, which would
carry a maximum sentence of twenty years in Pennsylvania.16 '
Lastly, Miller is quite prescriptive about what these
sentencing hearings should look like. The fundamental premise
behind the Court's rejection of mandatory life without parole
sentences for juveniles was its insistence that the factor of youth
be taken into account before the imposition of a state's harshest
penalties, and that each juvenile receive an individualized
sentence based upon the particular youth's age and the "wealth of
characteristics and circumstances attendant to it."'"
Justice
Kagan identified particular characteristics or attributes that
sentencers must consider. These include, at a minimum, age and
developmental attributes, some of which are immaturity,
impetuosity, failure to appreciate risks and consequences, the
juvenile's family and home environment, circumstances of

160. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Bradley, 295 A.2d 842, 845 (Pa. 1972)
(vacating defendant's death sentence in light of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972)), and imposing the next most severe statutorily authorized sentence of life
imprisonment).
161. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (2012).
162. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 106(b), 2502(b) (2012). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court heard argument on September 12, 2012, in two cases,
Commonwealth v. Batts, No. 79 MAP 2009, 2013 WL 1200252 (Pa. Mar. 26, 2013),
and Commonwealth v. Cunningham, see Juv. Law Ctr., Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania
v.
Ian
Cunningham,
JLC,
http://www.jlc.org/legaldocket/commonwealth-pennsylvania-v-ian-cunningham (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
The court considered the adoption of the lesser included offense sentencing scheme
for both first and second degree murder, in the absence of an alternative,
constitutional sentencing option. Batts at *7. Ultimately, the court in Batts held
that the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation in that case (Batts was
a fourteen-year-old who was given a mandatory life without parole sentence) was a
new sentencing hearing where the trial court could consider the factors detailed in
Miller, and impose a life sentence with eligibility for parole to be set by the trial
judge. Batts at *12. While Pennsylvania has approximately 500 juvenile lifers, the
Batts decision-limited to cases on direct appeal-will likely apply to less than
twenty juvenile lifers.
163. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012).
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the offense, the extent of his participation, the way familial and
peer pressures may have affected his or her behavior, a lack of
sophistication in dealing with a criminal justice system that is
designed for adults, and potential for rehabilitation."
Notably, Justice Kagan did not frame these considerations
as either specifically mitigators or aggravators; this suggests that
these sentencing hearings may more closely resemble juvenile
transfer hearings.

than the penalty phase in death penalty cases.

Since the question post-Miller is not life in prison or death, but the
opportunity for eventual release from prison, an exact parallel to
capital cases is not apt. Presumably, the criteria identified by
Justice Kagan will be viewed positively or negatively on a case-bycase, individualized basis.

IV. If Juveniles Will Now Be Eligible For Parole, We
Must Make Prison Programming Available and
Meaningful To Juvenile Offenders
For juvenile offenders, rehabilitation is often viewed as a
central goal of incarceration because of adolescents' malleability.
However, as we discuss below, rehabilitation is often undermined
by state laws and regulations that deny juvenile lifers access to
prison programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics
Anonymous, vocational training, and courses to achieve a GED or
college degree."'
In addition to being denied access to useful programming,
many juvenile lifers entered prison at a tumultuous developmental
time in their lives. They were ill-equipped for life in prison, where
they had to adjust to a primitive, Darwinian battle to survive.
164. Id. at 2468.
165. A juvenile transfer hearing occurs when a prosecutor has petitioned or
motioned for a juvenile criminal defendant to be transferred from the juvenile court
to the criminal court at the discretion of a judge. Richard E. Redding, Juveniles
Transferredto Criminal Court, 1997 UTAH L. REv 709, 717 (1997). The criteria for
granting such a transfer are defined by statute and vary by state. Id. at 718. Much
like the factors enumerated by Justice Kagan, the factors taken into consideration
in many state statutes do not require the judge to make a particular finding, and
how to weigh a factor, or whether a certain factor is positive or not, is left entirely
to the judge's discretion. Id.
166. Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila, What States Should Do to Provide a Meaningful
Opportunityfor Review and Release: Recognize Human Worth and Potential, 24 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 310, 340 (2012) (explaining that due to limited funding, many
prisons deny inmates with longer sentences access to rehabilitative programs).
167. Id. at 337.
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When juveniles start their sentences poorly-for any number of
reasons, including their efforts to "act tough" to get by-their
misbehavior can be used against them decades later.'6 8
This is one of many paradoxes of treating juvenile lifers as
though they are adults. There are others. As Ed Mulvey and
Carol Schubert have observed, "developing . . . adolescents will

flourish most productively when the demands of the environment
present challenges and supports for mastery of the skills needed to
move on to the next developmental phase."'69 Youth in prison are
not only victimized at high rates,' but there is a disruption of
normative life experiences.
There is little support for "positive identity formation," but
there is extensive peer support for additional criminality. There
are lost opportunities for learning."' In addition:
Removal from the community during adolescence in and of
itself has a profound effect on both present and future human
and social capital.

. .

. From the perspective of the adolescent,

removal from the community means loss of access to positive
social relationships in the context of school settings or
supportive work environments in the community and an
erosion of previously established positive relationships from
restricted contact (in person and by phone) with individuals on
the "outside."'
These factors place juvenile lifers far behind the starting line
for a race that measures their performance every day that they are
in prison. This is the most practical, and trenchant, of problems.
Consider Pennsylvania, which accounts for almost twenty
percent of the nation's juvenile lifer population."' Miller gives
Pennsylvania's juvenile lifers a new opportunity to challenge their

168. Id. at 334-35 ("The Nevada Administrative Regulations provide a detailed
list of aggravating and mitigating factors for a parole board to consider [including]
. . . (i) whether the prisoner has engaged in disruptive behavior while
incarcerated.").
169. Edward P. Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Youth in Prison and Beyond, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 843, 845

(Barry C. Feld & Donna M. Bishop eds., 2011).
170. Juv. LAw CTR., PROTECTING YOUTH IN THE PREA NATIONAL STANDARDS:
PUBLIC COMMENTS FROM YOUTH ADVOCATES ON PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT 17 (2011), available

at http://www.jlc.org/sites/default/files/publicationpdfs/PREAYouth
Comments-O.pdf ("Twelve percent of adjudicated youth in juvenile facilities
reported experiencing sexual abuse in 2008 and 2009.").
171. Mulvey & Schubert, supra note 169, at 845-50.
172. Id. at 852.
173. Matt Stroud & Liliana Segura, The Uncertain Fate of Pennsylvania's
Juvenile Lifers, NATION (Aug 7, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/169268/
uncertain-fate-pennsylvanias-juvenile-lifers.
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mandatory life without parole sentences. However, after decades
behind bars with no hope of release, it is not surprising that many
juvenile lifers in Pennsylvania have amassed lengthy prison
disciplinary records that will be difficult to explain to parole
boards.
One Pennsylvania juvenile lifer, Shariff I., wrote from "the
hole" about his struggle to overcome the hopelessness of his life
without parole sentence for more than fourteen years in prison
before the Supreme Court decided Miller. His words are haunting:
Because I had given up hope a long time ago[,] I was prepared
to die behind these walls. I gave up all hope of ever having an
opportunity to ever see life outside of these walls. You all have
slowly help[ed] to restore that hope. However during these
years of hopelessness, I've dug myself in a hole. I have stabbed
people, caught additional time in prison for assault on guards.
So I now have a minimum of 11 years to serve aside from my
life sentence [a]nd I wonder if any of these doors that are
opening [after Miller] will benefit me in any way. Is it too late
to turn things around or do I have a real shot. This is my
question to you[ ] [b]ecause there are those in here with me,
that giv[en] the opportunity would do what[ ]ever is required
to get out of here and stay out. We have bad prison records,
but are not bad people. We just got caught up in this jail house
maddness [sic] and had a rougher time than some others.
Some people have always held onto hope[;] others such as
myself felt it was easier to do my time by letting go of any
false hope, [a]nd because of that lack of hope our minds began
to deteriorate, and with no rehabilitation taking place for
us . .. our stress, anger, confusion, and frustration would lash

out. Along with losing all hope, we lost all patience. [Wie also
had to adapt to a violent environment at a young age, and
were forced to become a product [sic] of that environment in
some way. Either you are the wolf or the sheep in here. And I
learned this early on and felt if I have to spend the [rlest of my
life here I refuse to be the sheep. Now I look back and question
my decisions over the past 14 2 years. And I feel like all I had
to do is be patient, and not give up hope so fast, or so early. I
allowed my environment to get the best of me, and it may have
cost me my only shot left in getting out of here. But I just
wanted to . .. ask, please don't forget about those like myself,
that we can't change our past mistakes in here, and hope to
still have a chance to benefit from [the Miller decision and]
any leg[i]slation that is passed in regards to juvenile lifers."
Shariffs story is shared by many juvenile lifers throughout
the country who were locked up decades ago and told they would
"die behind these walls." Juvenile lifers interviewed in July 2006

174. Letter from Shariff I. to the Juv. Law Ctr. (July 17, 2012) (on file with the
authors).
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and 2007 by the Illinois Coalition for the Fair Sentencing of
Children (Illinois Coalition) said that "[coping with th[eir]
sentence was especially difficult in the first few years."7 Many
juveniles sentenced to life without the possibility of parole
contemplate suicide during the first years behind bars, and almost
all of them "struggle every day to find some purpose in their
lives."176 Other juvenile lifers share Shariffs feelings of frustration
and anger. Jaime J., one of Illinois's hundred-plus juvenile lifers,
told the Illinois Coalition that his life without parole sentence for a
crime he committed when he was fifteen years old made him feel
"written off and 'helpless.""7 Prison policies reinforce juvenile
lifers' sense of being "written off' by excluding them from
educational, vocational, and rehabilitative prison programming.
Such prison policies feed the "lack of hope" described in Shariffs
letter and ensure that "no rehabilitation take[es] place for us
Uuvenile lifers] ."
The Supreme Court observed in Graham that "[flor juvenile
offenders, who are most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation,
the absence of rehabilitative opportunities or treatment makes the
disproportionality of the [life without parole] sentence all the more
evident.""' The Court used the denial of rehabilitative services as
a justification for striking down mandatory life without parole
sentences for juveniles. Its analysis in Graham and Miller
suggests that policymakers must change the plethora of laws,
regulations, and policies that bar juvenile offenders from
rehabilitative services, including educational and vocational
training.o
Building upon Roper and Graham, the Miller Court spoke
repeatedly of youths' capacity for change in rejecting mandatory
life sentences.'"' After Miller, states must make sure that their
approach to prison programming, and its impact on parole
hearings, recognizes youths' capacities for rehabilitation and
leaves open the possibility of their release. Juveniles sentenced as
175. ILL. COAL. FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF CHILDREN, CATEGORICALLY LESS
CULPABLE: CHILDREN SENTENCED TO LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IN
ILLINOIS 20 (2008) [hereinafter CATEGORICALLY LESS CULPABLE].

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Letter from Shariff I. to the Juv. Law Ctr., supra note 174.
179. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (citations omitted).
180. Id. See also Brief for The Sentencing Project as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 11, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412 & 087621) (encouraging an analysis that would require legal changes to expand
opportunities for juvenile lifers).
181. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465, 2468-69, 2478, 2490 (2012).
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adults must have the opportunity to reform and make their case
for reentering society."

A.

State CorrectionalPrograms

Although the Miller Court's analysis of juvenile culpability
"rest[s] not only on common sense-on what 'any parent knows'[but] on science and social science as well,"" states too often fail to
require parole boards to consider a juvenile offender's age and
subsequent maturation in making parole decisions.
Consider Louisiana:
after Miller, there were over 330
juveniles serving life without the possibility of parole, making it
the state with the third largest juvenile lifer population in the
country."
Louisiana's prison regulations make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for the state's juvenile lifers to
participate in many programs run by the Department of Public
Safety and Corrections (Louisiana Corrections Department).
Under Louisiana law, juvenile offenders "convicted of forcible
rape, aggravated arson, armed robbery, attempted murder,
attempted armed robbery," and juveniles "sentenced as habitual
offenders" are ineligible for work release. The exceptions to this
rule include: offenders who have been imprisoned for less than
fifteen years during the last six months of their terms, as well as
offenders who have been imprisoned less than fifteen years and
during the last twelve months of their term [s]." Even if a juvenile
lifer was not sentenced to one of the offenses enumerated above,
Louisiana Corrections Department regulations preclude any
inmate from participation in work release until the prisoner "is
within two years of discharge."'86
Louisiana's work release
guidelines ensure that juvenile lifers will not be able to participate
because of their indefinite life sentences. Until juvenile lifers are
resentenced to a term of years with a definite release date, they
will be excluded from work release programs in Louisiana.
Florida, which has over 260 juvenile lifers," is similar to
Louisiana in its restrictions. While Florida's Youthful Offenders
Program provides many inmates with "a programmatically
182. Id. at 2469.
183. Id. at 2464.
184. HUM. RTS. WATCH, STATE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED 2,589 JUVENILE
OFFENDERS SERVING JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE (2012), available at

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related-material/updatedJLWOP10.09.pdf
[hereinafter STATE DISTRIBUTION OF JLWOP INMATES].

185. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §15:1111 (2012).
186. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 311 (2012).
187. STATE DISTRIBUTION OF JLWOP INMATES, supra notel84.
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diversified extended day of 16 hours . . . six days a week"

consisting of academic and vocational training, substance abuse
programs,

and counseling, juvenile

lifers are

systematically

excluded from participation in these programs." Under Florida
Department of Corrections regulations, juvenile offenders are
ineligible for the Youthful Offenders Program if they are serving
time for "murder, attempted murder, or an offense resulting in a

death," "sexual battery," "kidnapping," "carjacking," or "home
invasion robbery.""
California, which has the nation's fifth largest juvenile lifer
population,'

also has laws and regulations governing prison

administration that exclude juvenile lifers from participating in
rehabilitative activities.' 9 '

California's prison regulations often

exclude inmates who have committed violent crimes from prison
programs.

For instance, female inmates may not participate in

the Family Foundations program, a twelve-month substance abuse
program for expectant mothers, if they are sentenced for violent
crimes, including murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, or
"[any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state
prison for life."192
In addition, California, 9 3 Ohio,'94 and many other states'"9

prohibit juvenile lifers from earning "good time credits"'96 toward
release in any prison programs, including vocational programs,
educational programs, treatment programs for drug and alcohol

188. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.33-601.226(1)-(3) (2012).

189. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.33-601.226(3)(h) (2012).
190. HUM. RTS. WATCH & AMNESTY INT'L, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE

WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (2005),
availableat http://hrw.org/reports/2005/usl005/TheRestofTheirLives.pdf.
191. STATE DISTRIBUTION OF JLWOP INMATES, supra note 184
192. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1174.4(a)(2)(A)-(I) (West 2012); CAL. CODE REGS.

tit. 15, § 3074.3 (2012).
193. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933.05 (West 2009).
194. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120-2-06(V)(1) (2012) ("[Tlhe following prison terms
... shall not be reduced by any days of earned credit: (1) A prison term for which
an indefinite term of imprisonment is imposed.").
195. See, e.g., KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 44-6-114c (2012).
196. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3624(b)(1) (West 2008) (stating that only prisoners not
serving life sentences are eligible for "credit toward service of sentence for
satisfactory behavior" (what is frequently referred to in this article as "good time
credit")); James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel:Good Time, 30 UCLA L.

REV. 217, 221 (1982) (explaining "[tihere are at least three types of good time. The
first type rewards prisoners who conform with prison rules and regulations ...
[t]he second type rewards participation in prison programs and industries . . . [and]
[t]he third type is used to reward prisoners who give blood, serve as experimental
medical subjects, or perform such outstanding services as saving the life of a staff
member or fellow prisoner").
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Juvenile lifers'
addiction, and sex offender rehabilitation.'
inability to obtain "good time credit" may disadvantage them in
two ways. First, restrictions on eligibility for good time credit in
Ohio, Kansas, and other states prohibit individuals serving life
with or without the possibility of parole from earning earlier
release dates through good behavior.' Thus, even in states where
juvenile lifers have their life without parole sentences commuted
to life with parole sentences following Miller, they will still be
unable to prove their rehabilitation through participation in
educational, vocational, and rehabilitation programs.
Second,
states' definitions of "good time credit" associate these credits with
good behavior."' As noted earlier, juveniles entering prison often
struggle to maintain good behavior.2 0 0 Given this, parole boards
can easily misinterpret a former juvenile lifer's lack of "good time
credit" as a reflection of the inmate's bad character, rather than of
his or her inability to participate in prison programs because of
regulatory restrictions.
Illinois may not have statutory or regulatory restrictions on
juvenile lifers' participation in prison programs, but interviews
with Illinois's juvenile lifers illustrate the practical barriers they
face.20 ' Between 2006 and 2007, the Illinois Coalition for the Fair
Sentencing of Children interviewed 83 of the 103 juvenile
offenders in Illinois serving life without the possibility of parole.20 2
Many of Illinois's juvenile lifers described their struggle to gain
In
access to educational and vocational prison programs."
Illinois, juvenile lifers go to the back of the line of inmates
enrolling in prison programs because "prison policy gives
enrollment preferences to those with less time to serve."2 04
Juvenile lifers who were able to participate in educational
and vocational trainings found their experiences enriching, but
many who could not enroll described their lives as extraordinarily
boring and monotonous, "not living, just existing."2 0 5 One Illinois
lifer, Darnell F., "described waiting for chow as his full-time job."206

197. See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120-2-06(A) (2012).
198. Id. See also KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 44-6-114c (2012).
199. See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 169.110 (2011) (establishing that Oregon juvenile
courts will grant good time credit for good behavior).
200. Glynn & Vila, supra note 166, at 337-39.
201. CATEGORICALLY LESS CULPABLE, supra note 175.
202. Id. at 20 n.35.
203. Id. at 21-23.
204. Id. at 21.
205. Id. at 22.
206. Id.
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Since Illinois law does not explicitly exclude juvenile lifers from
participation in rehabilitative programs, these interviews show
that regulations and statutes tell only a partial story about the
exclusion of juvenile lifers from prison programming. Prison
administrators in many others jurisdictions may likewise exercise
their substantial discretion to exclude juvenile lifers from
participation in educational and vocational training, substance
abuse rehabilitation, and sex offender treatment.
B. Federal Programs

Reflecting pre-Miller biases, juvenile lifers, including those
sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, are often excluded
from participation in prison programs for educational and
Though
vocational training funded by federal grants.207
incarcerated juvenile offenders need educational proficiency and
job skills in order to obtain gainful employment upon their release
from prison, they often cannot access federal student aid
distributed by the U.S. Department of Education. The Federal
Pell Grant Program, administered by the U.S. Department of
Education, provides financial assistance of up to $5,550 per year to
5.4 million low-income students enrolled full-time or part-time in
American colleges, universities, and vocational schools.20 8 But, in
1994, Congress amended the Federal Pell Grant Program, as part
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, to prohibit
the use of Pell Grants to fund the education of "any individual who
is incarcerated in any Federal or State penal institution."20 s Thus,
juvenile offenders incarcerated in state or federal prisons cannot
receive assistance for post-secondary education under the Federal
Pell Grant Program even if they would otherwise qualify for
federal student aid.210

207. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 20
U.S.C. § 1070(a)(b)(6) (2012) (establishing that "no Federal Pell Grant shall be
awarded under this subpart to any individual who is incarcerated in any Federal or
State penal institution or who is subject to an involuntary civil commitment upon
completion of a period of incarceration for a forcible or non-forcible sexual offense").
208. See, e.g., Minn. Office of Higher Educ., GET READY FOR COLLEGE: FEDERAL
PELL GRANT (2012), http://www.getreadyforcollege.org/
gPg.cfm?pagelD=139&1534-D83A_1933715A=
f07538b484e4efd0ba6d933da0d63412d7e48b3c (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
209. 20 U.S.C. § 1070 (a)(b)(6) (2012).
210. See FED. STUDENT AID, INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS AND ELIGIBILITY FOR
FEDERAL
STUDENT
AID
1
(2012),
available
at

https://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/aid-info-for-incarcerated-individuals.pdf
("An individual incarcerated in a federal or state institution is ineligible to receive
a Federal Pell Grant or federal student loans.").
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Even when the federal government funds educational
proficiency programs in prisons to promote "acquir[ing]
educational and job skills," these programs have eligibility
requirements that often exclude juvenile lifers.2" To qualify for
federally funded prison programs that educate state prisoners or
teach them job skills, juveniles incarcerated in U.S. penal
institutions must satisfy maximum age and offense restrictions,
which juvenile lifers will often be unable to meet.212 In an effort to
channel federal education funds to youthful offenders, Congress
initially set an age limit of twenty-five-later raised to thirtyfive-years of age for each participant in prison education
programs funded by the federal government. That is, inmates
older than thirty-five are ineligible.212
Ironically, these age restrictions prevent educational and
vocational training for juvenile offenders who have been
incarcerated for decades in the jurisdictions that had mandatory
life without parole sentences for juveniles.214 Many juvenile lifers
today-finding themselves with apparent post-Miller opportunities
for parole-will discover that they are too old for these federal
programs. Juvenile offenders convicted of murder, or certain
crimes against children, are also categorically excluded from
participating in prisoner education programs funded by federal
grants.21 Federal law thus raises barriers to rehabilitation of
juvenile offenders whom the Supreme Court has deemed capable
of rehabilitation.
Combined with state barriers to prison
programming, these policies make it harder for juvenile lifers to
demonstrate to parole boards that they are ready for release.
State parole policies add even more burdens.
V.

State Corrections and Parole
Miller requires states to rethink parole opportunities for
juveniles who are convicted as adults for capital crimes. Parole
offers prisoners the opportunity to earn early release from prison
based on factors that typically include good behavior and
Parole systems
participation in rehabilitative programs.21
211. 20 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
212. Id.
213. Id. at (a)(1).
214. The forty-six jurisdictions which had mandatory life without parole
sentences for juveniles prior to Miller include forty-four states, the District of
Columbia, and the federal government. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,
2035 (2010).
215. 20 U.S.C. § 1151 (e)(3).
216. For a selection of statutes authorizing "good time credit" for successful
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advance society's goals for criminal punishment. These include
retribution, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence.217
In most jurisdictions, prisoners can increase their chances for
parole or earn time off their sentence by participating in
educational, vocational, and rehabilitative programs. 21 8 This credit
for good behavior, or "good time," improves safety inside prisons.
It is also justified on rehabilitative grounds since prisoners'
participation in educational and substance-abuse programs
decreases their likelihood of recidivism, and increases the chance
that inmates will be able to function when they are paroled. 22 0 The
need for incapacitation thus diminishes because inmates over time
pose less of a post-release risk to public safety. 221
Unfortunately, as discussed above, juveniles sentenced as
adults are often denied meaningful opportunities to participate in
rehabilitative programming. They are thus, ironically, less likely
to become eligible for parole. Consequently, current practices in
many jurisdictions undermine Miller's premises. Miller, like
Roper and Graham, recognized "the great difficulty . . . of

distinguishing at this early age between 'the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and
the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption."'222
Rehabilitative programming and meaningful
opportunities for parole are the vehicles by which society can
distinguish the former from the latter.
In response to Miller legislatures and courts must
conceptualize anew the purposes of punishment for juveniles.
Legislatures, courts, and corrections agencies must also
reconceptualize correctional programming (rehabilitation) and
parole (incapacitation) for juveniles.22 3 Denial of, or reduction in,
completion of educational, vocational, and rehabilitative programs, see Michael M.
O'Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation:A New Theory of Indeterminate Sentencing, 48 AM.

CRIM. L. REV. 1247, app. (2011) (compiling recent changes in "earned-time" parole
credit throughout the United States).
217. See HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-61(1968).
218. See O'Hear,supra note 216.
219. Nora V. Demleitner, Good Conduct Time: How Much and for Whom? The
Unprincipled Approach of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing, 61 FLA. L. REV. 777,
782 (2009).
220. Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation:
How the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 1, 22 (2011).
221. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010).
222. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
223. The final purposes of punishment-specific and general deterrence-are not
relevant to this discussion. As the Court observed in Roper v. Simmons, "the same
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that
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correctional programming, and the consequent denial of parole
because of the absence of programming, defies Miller's implied
requirement that states allow convicted murderers to show, over
time, why they should be released. States must eliminate this
"catch-22": denying juveniles correctional programming increases
the chances that they will misbehave while in prison, prevents
them from building evidence of rehabilitation, increases the
chances that they will be a risk if released, and almost certainly
reduces any chance they will have for parole.
A. CorrectionalProgrammingand Its Relationshipto
Parole
Many state codes explicitly require parole boards to use
rehabilitation as the central benchmark for parole decisions.
Missouri, for example, describes the goals of its substance abuse
rehabilitation programs for persons convicted of a drug offense as
four-fold: "(A) To promote a drug- and crime-free lifestyle; (B) To
provide education and/or treatment on the multi-faceted
consequences of substance use; (C) To explore intervention and
treatment options; and (D) To contribute to public health and
safety in Missouri."224 Missouri's stated goal "[t]o contribute to
public health and safety" demonstrates that rehabilitation can
reduce the need for incapacitation.
In Missouri, the purpose of parole hearings is to "[d]iscuss
progress made, or expected to be made, toward rehabilitation

juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
571 (2005). It is clear that teens in general will not adjust their behavior by
anticipating whether they will be rehabilitated or paroled many decades in the
future. It is also clear that, for purposes of specific deterrence, an inmate serving a
sentence will be more likely to behave if there is a possibility of release tied to good
behavior. We thus deem deterrence related to inmate behavior subsumed by our
discussion of rehabilitation and incapacitation.
224. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 9, § 30-3.230 (2012).
225. An obvious example is the need for drug and alcohol programming. Many
states correctly view drug and alcohol addiction as a major cause of violent crime.
See Nat'l Council on Alcoholism & Drug Dependence, Alcohol, Drugs and Crime,
http://www.ncadd.orglindex.php/for-youth/drugs-and-crime/230NCADD.ORG,
alcohol-drugs-and-crime (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). According to a survey of
American prisoners, fifty-four percent of prisoners incarcerated for violent crimes
in the U.S. report drug or alcohol use at the time of their offense, and sixty to
eighty percent of incarcerated drug abusers will reoffend upon release. ANN H.
CROWE & RHONDA REEVES, TREATMENT FOR ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG ABUSE:

OPPORTUNITIES FOR COORDINATION ch. 14 (1994); Nat'1 Ass'n of Drug Court Profls,
The Facts on Drugs and Crime in America, NADCP.ORG (2008), available at
http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/Facts%20on%2ODrug%20Courts%20.
pdf. Hence, parole programs designed to encourage participation in substance
abuse programs can be justified on grounds of rehabilitation and incapacitation.
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while confined."2 26 Other states, like Massachusetts, make a more
explicit connection between rehabilitation and incapacitation.
They emphasize the parole board's duty both to incapacitate
dangerous criminals and to release prisoners whose continued
incapacitation is no longer necessary to protect the public.227 The
dual goals of rehabilitation and incapacitation are served by
programs that use "good time credit" to encourage prisoners to
participate in drug and alcohol treatment programs. Prisoners
who receive substance abuse treatment in prison are more likely to
find gainful employment upon release and less likely to
recidivate. 2 8 These results serve the goal of using parole to
encourage long-term rehabilitation of offenders.
In addition, parole guidelines that authorize the release of
offenders undergoing substance
abuse treatment, while
discouraging the release of untreated addicts and alcoholics, help
ensure the continued incapacitation of those most dangerous to
society. Offenders who continue to use drugs and alcohol are far
more likely to commit violent crimes than offenders who are not
addicted to drugs or alcohol, or are recovering from addiction.2 2 9
Parole guidelines designed to encourage drug and alcohol
treatment, and prevent the release of active addicts or alcoholics,
link the need for incapacitation to post-release risks to public
safety. Prisoners may be more likely to participate in treatment
programs-and eschew use of drugs that violate prison rules-if
they know that a clean disciplinary record will be a sign of
rehabilitation.2 30
On the surface, it is encouraging that some states link the
need for incapacitation to rehabilitation. In practice, however, this
link is often illusory. Several states expressly prohibit parole
boards from making decisions for release based solely on
rationales of rewarding good behavior. Thus, Massachusetts law,
despite its encouraging guidance to parole boards, also provides:
No prisoner shall be granted a parole permit merely as a
reward for good conduct but only if the parole board is of the
opinion that there is a reasonable probability that, if such
prisoner is released, he will live and remain at liberty without
226. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 14, § 80-2.010 (West 2012).
227. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 130 (2012).
228. See NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE POPULATIONS: A RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE 15-23 (2012),
availableat http://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/files/podat cj_2012.pdf.
229. Id.

230. See, e.g., LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. XI, § 301 (2012) ("No inmate may be
paroled while there is pending against him any indictment or bill of information for
any crimes suspected of having been committed by him while a prisoner.").
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violatina the law. and231that his release is not incompatible with
the welfare of society.
The latter requirement gives parole boards enormous
discretion to advance the kind of retributive policy upon which
Miller frowns. It is an open invitation to ignore how an offender's
life unfolds, while giving undue weight to the nature of the crime.
B.

DifferentiatingJuvenile from Adult Offenders

The American Bar Association (ABA) adopted a policy in
2008 that built upon Roper and anticipated Miller by calling for
different sentencing and parole policies for offenders who were
under eighteen at the time of their crimes. With respect to parole,
the ABA declared that:
Youthful offenders should generally be eligible for parole or
other early release consideration at a reasonable point during
their sentence; and, if denied, should be reconsidered for
parole or early release periodically thereafter. 232
Most state parole guidelines, however, do not differentiate
between juvenile and adult offenders. 23 3 A prisoner's eligibility for
parole is determined on the basis of many factors, but the most
important factors for parole eligibility are typically: (1) the offense
committed, and (2) the offender's post-conviction conduct in
prison.2 3 4 While these considerations should be a basis for parole
decisions, state laws and regulations should also explicitly direct
parole boards to consider the offender's youth at the time of any
offense(s) or rules violation(s) and subsequent evidence of
maturation. In other words, parole boards should be required to
replace the offense-centered and largely discretionary evaluation
of juvenile offenders' parole eligibility with the offender-centered
approach established in Roper, Graham, and Miller. In the postMiller world, parole guidelines must be revised to reflect the
particular circumstances of juvenile offenders.
Louisiana's parole guidelines are typical of the current
approach that treats all offenders similarly, regardless of their age
231. MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 130 (2012).
232. AM. BAR Assoc. CRIM. JUST. SECTION, THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
2007-2008, at 317 (Victor Streib ed., 2008).
233. For example, Massachusetts also has a single-track set of parole guidelines.
120 MASS. CODE REGS. 300.05(1) (2012). The parole board is directed to consider
available information such as "the inmate's prior criminal record" and "official
reports of the nature and circumstances of the offense." Id. at (b), (e). However,
nothing in the parole guidelines suggests that the parole board should consider
juvenile and adult offenders separately.
234. See Norval Morris, The ContemporaryPrison, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
THE PRISON 227, 242 (Morris & Rothman eds., 1995).
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at the time of the crime. All persons convicted of "a crime of
violence committed on or after January 1, 1997" are ineligible for
parole until they have served eighty-five percent of their time.235
This requirement applies to all parole-eligible offenders, including
juvenile offenders, and appears to conflict with the Supreme
Court's admonition that juveniles-including those who commit
violent crimes-must be treated differently than adult offenders.
Making youth an explicit factor in parole guidelines, like
those found in Louisiana, is all the more important because these
guidelines include "prison records" as a central factor in making
parole decisions.236 If parole boards simply consider a juvenile
offender's overall prison record without considering whether the
juvenile's record has improved over time, with fewer violations as
the inmate ages, they fail to adequately appreciate the
developmental factors that make juvenile offenders less dangerous
over time.237 Parole guidelines should reflect Miller's recognition
that adolescence is a temporary state where "personality traits
. . . are more transitory, less fixed" than characteristics of adult
inmates.238
Other states give the illusion of taking age into account when
inmates are considered for parole. For example, in Missouri-with
its apparently promising principles described above-juvenile
lifers are "eligible for parole after a minimum of fifteen (15) years
has [sic] been served, except where statute would require more
time to be served."239 After this minimum period of time, the
parole board may place an offender "on parole only when the board
believes that he is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a
law-abiding citizen."240 This law gives Missouri the appearance of
having a parole system tied to rehabilitation (which in turn affects
the need for incapacitation)-Missouri law seems to permit the
release of prisoners when they have demonstrated sufficient
rehabilitation that they are no longer a threat to the community.
Missouri's Parole Board Guidelines reinforce this
appearance: the board "[e]valuate[s] the offender individually in
regard to suitability for community reentry," which could include
an evaluation of the individual's maturation from a juvenile
235. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. XI, § 303 (2012).
36. Id.
237. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010) (describing most
crimes committed by juveniles as the result of "transient immaturity" which would
disappear as they aged, thus demonstrating improvement over time).
238. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
239. Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 14, § 80-2.010 (2012).
240. Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.690 (2012).
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criminal to a law-abiding adult.14 ' The parole board should also
consider "the offender's institutional adjustment and civility
including participation in work, school and treatment programs,
restorative justice activities, other cognitive restructuring
programs and conduct violation history."24 ' Thus, offenders who
are participating in, and earning good time credit for, prison
programming should be eligible for parole sooner than other
offenders. However, many juvenile lifers are prohibited from
earning good time credit pursuant to Section 558.041 of the
Missouri code.
Under Missouri law, juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment
for murder, attempted murder, forcible rape, or statutory rape in
the first-degree are prohibited from receiving credit toward early
release
for
educational,
vocational,
and rehabilitative
programming.'" Because of this, juvenile lifers in Missouri often
face yet another "catch-22", whereby they must demonstrate their
rehabilitation to parole boards by earning "good time" in prison
programs from which they are categorically excluded. 44
In Georgia, juveniles serving terms of life imprisonment are
quite unlikely to be granted parole expeditiously. The Georgia
Board of Pardons and Paroles is only required to review parole
decisions every eight years for juveniles and adults sentenced to
life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.24 5 Moreover,
Georgia's Parole Decision Guidelines (Parole Guidelines)
systematically disadvantage youthful offenders who have
committed serious crimes, but are no longer a threat to society.'
The Parole Guidelines provide objective criteria for evaluating
parole candidates. Georgia's Parole Guidelines are based on a
numerical point system-much like points on driver's licenses in
many states-called "a Risk to Re-Offend Score," where inmates
with fewer points have the opportunity for earlier parole .247
Because of the severity of most juvenile lifers' crimes (typically,
241. STATE OF Mo. DEP'T OF CORRS. BD. OF PROB. & PAROLE, PROCEDURES
GOVERNING THE GRANTING OF PAROLES AND CONDITIONAL RELEASES 4 (2009)

[hereinafter PROCEDURES GOVERNING PAROLE].

242. Id.
243. MO. REV. STAT.

§

558.041(1) (2012) ("Any offender committed to the

department of corrections, except those persons committed pursuant to subsection
6 of section 558.016 [including murder and attempted murder], or subsection 3 of
section 558.018 [including forcible rape and statutory rape in the first degree], may
receive additional credit in terms of days spent in confinement.").
244. See id.
245. GA. CoMP. R. & REGS. 475-3-.05 (2012).

246. Id.
247. Id.
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murder, attempted murder, voluntary manslaughter, or rape),
they are invariably lumped into "Crime Severity Level VIII,"
which is the highest category of crimes in the Parole Guidelines.248
Juvenile lifers in Crime Severity Level VIII must serve a
minimum of sixty-five percent of their time, and the Parole
Guidelines ensure that the vast majority of juvenile lifers will
serve between seventy-five percent and ninety percent of their
sentence.24 9
In addition, Georgia's point-based parole guidelines give
preference to criminals who enter prison at an older age. 2 50 Thus,
juvenile offenders receive no point reduction whereas parole
candidates between the ages of twenty and forty at the time of
their imprisonment receive a one-point deduction from their total
Risk to Re-Offend Score and are more likely to receive parole;
candidates who were older than forty at the time of their
incarceration receive a two-point deduction.25 '
Finally, Georgia's Parole Guidelines disadvantage juvenile
lifers because they provide no objective means of calculating sixtyfive percent, seventy-five percent, or ninety percent of an
indeterminate life sentence. The Parole Guidelines focus almost
exclusively on juvenile lifers' past behavior rather than their
rehabilitation and improvement over time.252
Conclusion
Unless and until Miller is clearly held to be retroactive, full
implementation of the decision will roll out slowly and
inconsistently across jurisdictions.
But the questions and
challenges Miller presents require our attention now.
Approximately 2,100 juveniles have been sentenced to mandatory
life without parole sentences in this country. Some of them will be
re-sentenced pursuant to new legislation passed in response to
Miller, but some percentage of them will likely fall in a sentencing
void, with no available constitutional sentence to guide resentencing courts. At the opposite end of the spectrum, juvenile
248. Id. at 475-3-.05(9)(a)-(d). See also R.I. CODE R. § 49, 1 (LexisNexis 2012)
(Rhode Island applies age as a factor in its point system for its parole board
guidelines.); 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 145.2 (2012) (Texas applies age as a factor in
point system in parole board guidelines.).
249. Because they start their sentences at a younger age, juvenile lifers will thus
have a longer time to wait for parole opportunities than adults convicted of the
same offenses.
250. See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 475-3-.05(8)(e) (2012).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 475-3-.05(5), (8).
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lifers will also start facing parole boards, but they will confront a
parole system hostile to their release because of built-in obstacles
they cannot control. In both cases, these challenges also present
opportunities to imagine a better way to sentence and ultimately
release many juveniles convicted in the criminal justice system.

